This Connecticut law primer explains key issues including jury duty, jury service, and police brutality and other civil rights claims. It is designed to help people understand their rights if they are called to serve on a jury or are affected by police use of force. Mark D. Arons is a board certified top personal injury trial lawyer who handles personal injury and civil rights cases across Connecticut. He specializes in such high-profile Connecticut cases as: car/auto accidents, police brutality and use of force,  fall-down accidents, work-related accidents, injuries caused by defective and dangerous products, and wrongful death lawsuits. Mark provides a driven, results-oriented approach for personal injury victims throughout Connecticut. 

After a Car Accident (04.09.2026)
If you or a loved one has been injured in a car accident, the steps you take in the hours, days, and weeks
that follow can make a critical difference — both for your health and for any legal claim you may have. This guide walks you through what to do.

1.  AT THE SCENE
•  Do not leave. Stay at the scene until law enforcement clears you to leave. Leaving prematurely can have serious legal consequences.
•  Call 911. Call 911 to report the accident and request medical assistance if anyone is injured. A police report is important documentation for your claim.
•  Do not admit fault. Even a simple 'I'm sorry' can later be used against you to suggest you were at fault.
•  Document everything. Take photos of all vehicles, damage, road conditions, skid marks, traffic signals, and any visible injuries — before cars are moved if possible.
•  Exchange information. Collect names, addresses, driver's license numbers, insurance information, and plate numbers from all drivers involved.
•  Identify witnesses. Ask any bystanders for their names and contact information before they leave.

 2.  MEDICAL CARE
•  Seek care immediately. Go to an emergency room, urgent care, or your doctor right away — even if you feel fine. Adrenaline can mask pain, and delayed treatment is one of the most common ways insurers challenge injury claims.
•  Be thorough with providers. Tell your provider about every symptom, no matter how minor it seems. Failing to mention a complaint early can complicate your case later.
•  Follow all treatment recommendations. Do not skip appointments or stop treatment without medical guidance. Gaps in care can be used to minimize the value of your claim.
•  Keep records. Keep a record of every medical appointment, provider, prescription, and out-of-pocket expense from day one.

3.  PROTECTING YOUR LEGAL CLAIM
•  Contact an attorney promptly. Evidence disappears quickly — surveillance footage is overwritten, witnesses forget, and physical evidence is lost. Contacting an attorney early helps preserve what matters.
•  Do not speak to adverse insurance. Do not give a recorded statement to the other driver's insurance company without speaking to an attorney first.
•  Preserve evidence. Do not repair your vehicle until it has been documented or inspected. Keep damaged clothing and any other physical evidence.
•  Know the deadline. In Connecticut, you generally have two years from the date of injury to file a personal injury lawsuit. Missing this deadline bars your claim entirely.
•  Notify your own insurer. Your own insurance policy likely requires you to report accidents promptly, but be cautious about what you say.

4.  INSURANCE & PRACTICAL STEPS
•  File the appropriate claims. You may file a claim with the at-fault driver's insurer (third-party) and/or your own insurer (uninsured/underinsured motorist, MedPay, collision coverage).
•  Document all losses. Track lost wages, mileage to medical appointments, and all out-of-pocket costs carefully from the start.
•  Avoid social media. Defense attorneys and insurance companies routinely monitor social media. Avoid posting anything about the accident, your injuries, or your activities.
•  Do not sign anything. Do not sign any release or settlement agreement from an insurer without having an attorney review it first. You may be signing away rights you don't know you have.

What is “Negligence” (03.25.2026)
Negligence, in the context of accidents like car crashes or slip-and-falls, is the legal concept that
holds someone responsible for harm caused by their failure to act with reasonable care. To
prove negligence, four elements generally must be established:

1. Duty of Care The person at fault had a legal obligation to act reasonably toward others. For example, drivers have a duty to follow traffic laws and drive safely. Property owners have a dutyto maintain reasonably safe premises for visitors.

2. Breach of Duty The person at fault failed to meet that standard of care. In an auto accident, this might be running a red light, speeding, or texting while driving. In a slip-and-fall, it might be failing to clean up a spill or failing to warn of a known hazard.

3. Causation The breach actually caused the injury. This has two parts:
•  Actual cause (“but-for” causation): The injury would not have happened but for thedefendant’s action or inaction.
•  Proximate cause: The harm was a foreseeable result of the breach — not some wildly unrelated chain of events.

4. Damages There was actual, measurable harm resulting — physical injury, medical bills, lost wages, pain and suffering, etc. Without real “damages”, there’s no negligence claim even if someone acted carelessly.

A few related concepts worth knowing:
•  Comparative negligence: Many states apportion fault between parties. If you were 20% at fault in a car accident, your compensation may be reduced by 20%.
•  Contributory negligence: A handful of states bar any recovery if the injured party was even slightly at fault.
•  Premises liability: The specific branch of negligence law governing slip-and-falls, which can depend on whether you were an invited guest, a customer, or a trespasser.
•  Negligence per se: If someone violated a law (like a traffic statute) and that violation caused the injury, negligence may be presumed automatically.

Overview of the civil jury selection process in Connecticut Superior Court for a personal injury case.
(03.16.2026)

Stage 1: Juror Qualification and Summoning
The jury pool is drawn from a composite list of Connecticut residents, compiled from registered voters, driver's license and state ID holders, personal income tax filers, and recipients of state social services. To qualify for jury service, a prospective juror must be of sound mind and capable of performing a sedentary job requiring close attention for three consecutive business days at six hours per day, and must not have been convicted of a felony in Connecticut within the preceding seven years.

Stage 2: Orientation at the Courthouse
The day begins with prospective jurors reporting to the courthouse, signing in, and watching an orientation video that introduces them to the justice system and defines concepts like burden of proof. By around 10:00 AM, attorneys assemble and briefly introduce their respective cases — disclosing who they represent, where they work, the expected start date, and the anticipated length of trial. They also identify witnesses and others connected to the case, so jurors can flag any relationships.

Stage 3: Individual Voir Dire — Connecticut's Constitutional Hallmark
This is the defining feature of Connecticut jury selection and the stage where most of the work happens.
Connecticut is the only jurisdiction in the country that grants the right to individual voir dire outside the presence of other prospective jurors as a matter of right in all cases. All other states and the federal system conduct some form of panel voir dire, where lawyers speak to prospective jurors as a group.

The right to question each juror individually by counsel is guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution, Article I § 19, and CGS § 51-240 specifically protects a party's right to examine jurors outside the presence of other prospective jurors.

The dual purposes of voir dire are well-established: it provides information upon which the trial court may decide which prospective jurors should be excused for cause, and it provides information to counsel to aid in the exercise of peremptory challenges.

Scope of Questioning. The trial court has broad discretion to control the scope of questioning, which should be limited to testing an individual's capacity and competency to serve. Questions should be fairly related to the issues or parties and aimed at discovering whether a juror can find the facts without bias, ill-will, or prejudice. Questions that might plant prejudice in the juror's mind should be prevented. That said, whenever there is a likelihood that prejudice may exist in a prospective juror that will affect the outcome of the case, the party affected should be afforded sufficient latitude to uncover it (State v. Smith, 46 Conn. App. 600 (1997)).

Topics routinely covered include home, family, education, employment, military service, community involvement, prior jury service, prior involvement in civil litigation, attitudes toward lawsuits and damages, personal injury experiences, medical history relevant to case issues, insurance, and familiarity with any party, witness, or counsel.

Timing. In the civil context, individual voir dire typically takes between two and four days, though in multi-party cases it can extend to three weeks.

Stage 4: Challenges Challenge for Cause.
Either party may challenge a prospective juror for cause — i.e., demonstrating actual bias, inability to be fair, or a disqualifying relationship. A potential juror who is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict will be dismissed by the judge. There is no statutory limit on challenges for cause.

Peremptory Challenges. In a standard civil action, each party may challenge peremptorily three jurors under CGS § 51-241. However, where alternate jurors are seated (as is common in longer PI trials), each party may peremptorily challenge four jurors under CGS § 51-243. No reason need be given for a peremptory challenge, though race- and gender-based strikes remain prohibited under Batson and its progeny.

Unity of Interest / Multi-Party Cases. Where the court determines that a unity of interest exists among several plaintiffs or several defendants, those parties may be considered a single party for purposes of peremptory challenges, or the court may allow additional challenges to be exercised separately or jointly. A unity of interest is presumed to exist among parties represented by the same attorney or firm, and among parties who have filed no cross-claims or apportionment complaints against one another. Critically, the total number of peremptory challenges allowed to one side shall not exceed twice the number allowed to the other side.

Timing of Challenges. A party has no right to a peremptory challenge after accepting a juror at the conclusion of examination. Challenges must be made before moving to the next juror.

Stage 5: Jury Composition
A civil jury in Connecticut consists of six regular jurors, usually with two alternate jurors — though the number of alternates may be larger depending on the length of the case. Alternates undergo the same examination and challenge process as regular jurors. If a regular juror becomes unable to continue during trial, an alternate designated by lot becomes a member of the regular panel, and if deliberations have already begun, the court must instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew.

Jury service is one of the most important ways ordinary people participate in our justice system, especially in cases involving police brutality, civil rights claims, and police use of force. When you report for jury duty, you bring your life experience, common sense, and community values into the courtroom, helping judges and lawyers fairly evaluate evidence and decide whether the law has been broken. By taking jury service seriously and listening carefully in cases about police use of force and civil rights claims, you help ensure accountability, protect constitutional rights, and strengthen public trust in the courts and in the way our legal system addresses police brutality.

Law – Legal Theories - Vanderbilt Law School: Police excessive force - constitutional violations. (03.02.2026)

Second Circuit, US District Court for District of Connecticut, and State Court 
“[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, which governs the use of force in connection with an arrest, law enforcement officers may use only such force as is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,  397 (1989). It is not objectively reasonable for an officer to use deadly force to apprehend a suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11 (1985). 

“The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer's use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. The force used by the officer must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer.”  Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2000). 

Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity “shields police officers acting in their official capacity from suits for damages unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.” Cane v. New Britain Police Dept., et al, USDC, D. Conn., No. 3:16 cv-01638- MPS (5/8/23, Shea, USDJ), quoting McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730, 738 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 553 (2d Cir. 2006) (ellipses omitted)). "When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, courts consider whether the facts shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of [the] defendant's alleged misconduct." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). "A right is clearly established if the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 739 (alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted). "Although we do not  require a case directly on point to hold that a defendant's conduct violated a clearly established right, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or  constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quotation marks and citations  omitted). "[I]n an excessive force case, the issue of qualified immunity necessarily overlaps considerably with the question of liability on the underlying claim, as both require an assessment of the objective reasonableness of the arresting officer's conduct.” Diaz v. Hartford Police Dep't, No. 3:18CV1113(KAD), 2021 WL  1222187, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2021). See also Scott v. Heinrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In Fourth Amendment unreasonable force cases, unlike in  other cases, the qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

“Summary judgment should not be granted on the basis of a qualified immunity defense premised on an assertion of objective reasonableness unless the defendant ‘show[s] that no reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could conclude that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.’” Id., quoting Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 

“Further, given the difficult problem posed by a suit for the use of deadly force, in which ‘the witness most likely to contradict [the police officer’s] story-the person not dead-is unable to testify[,] the court may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police officer’” O’Bert, supra, quoting Scott v. Henrich, supra, at 915. 

Although we do not require a case “directly on point” to hold that a defendant's conduct violated a clearly established right, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.  73, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017); Terebesi v. Toresso, 764 F.3d  217, 231 (2d Cir. 2014).  

“Ordinarily, in order for the law to be ‘clearly established’, there must be a Supreme Court or [Second Circuit] decision on-point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Duty To Intervene 
The claim of failure to intercede was made in Santana. The court held that while the officer did not fire her weapon, “as a police officer, she ‘ha[d] an affirmative duty to intercede on behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in [her] presence by other officers”, quoting O’Neill V. Krzeminski, 839  F. 2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988). See also, Gagnon v. Ball, 696 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir.  1982). Odom, infra. See also Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994),  reh’g den., 27 F.3d 29 (1994). 

“It is ‘widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence, and a police officer is liable  for failing to intercede when excessive force is being used when there was a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Chapdelaine v. Desjardin, US Dist. Ct., D. Conn., 3:20 –cv-00779 (MPS) (2022), quoting ”Simcoe v. Gray, 577 Fed. Appx. 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). “Whether in officer had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the harm being caused by another officer is an issue  of fact for the jury unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly conclude otherwise.” Anderson, supra.  

In Jackson v. Tellado, 236 F. Supp. 3d 636 (EDNY 2017), the court held that “officers found liable for failing to intervene in other officers’ use of excessive  force [are] not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 669.  

Trooper Jackson and WH Officer Rappa were on the passenger side. Rappa broke the window and Jackson deployed his taser. Trooper Dalling was present and did  nothing to intervene or de-escalate. Sgt. Zwickler (West Haven), raking officer on the scene, did nothing to intervene and de-escalate.  

Prior to the West Haven officer breaking the passenger window, and prior to Mubarak being tased by the Trooper, he sat motionless, eyes closed, staring straight ahead. It appeared that the breaking of the window, and use of the taser, startled him and woke him up. 

Initiating and Gratuitous Force 
It is well established that “the use of entirely gratuitous forceis unreasonable and therefore excessive.” Chapdelaine,supra, quoting Muschette v. Gionfrido, 910 F.3d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2018). 

The Second Circuit has observed that “the police may violate clearly established law by initiating significant force against a suspect who is only passively resisting.” O’Hara v. City of New York, 570 Fed. Appx. 21, 24 (2d Cir. 2014). 

Officers may not use their “reckless and unconstitutional provocation” of the suspect as justification for the use of force. Billington V Smith, 292 F. 3d 1177,  1189 (9th Cir. 2002).  

Prior to the West Haven officer breaking the passenger window, and prior to Mubarak being tased by the Trooper, he sat motionless, eyes closed, staring straight ahead. The force used by Rappa and Jackson was completely gratuitous and unnecessary. It appeared that the breaking of the window startled Mubarak and woke him up. 

When the officers saw that Mubarak had something in his hand and was “reaching”, they correctly and properly moved backwards away from the car  door. The statement by the officer on the passenger side that Mubarak was  “reaching” was in no way a direction to Trooper North to open fire.  

It may be that Mubarak was not resisting at all, given that he was permitted no time or the opportunity to comply with the initial command to exit the car. The driver’s side door was blocked by a police vehicle, and officers with guns drawn  were on the passenger side. There is also a center console between the two front seats.  

The command to “drop the knife” was given by Trooper North only after he shot Mubarak seven times.

The time from the officers surrounding Mubarak to the time he was shot was 40 seconds. No officer had even attempted to open a dialogue with Mubarak. There was no call for a supervisor. 

Taser
In Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 400 Fed. Appx. 592 (2d Cir. 2010), the court determined that the police officers use of stun gunson protester arrestees did not constitute excessive force in violation of the fourth amendment, where the arrestees were actively resisting their arrest.  

In MacLeod v. Town of Brattleboro, 548 F. Appx. 6 (2d Cir. 2013), the use of a Taserby a police officer on an individual who disobeyed an order to kneel on the  ground by rising to his feet, was held not to be excessive force.  

In Odom v. Matteo, 772 F. Supp. 377 (D. Conn. 2011), the court stated that “the  use of a Taseris a significant use of force….” 

Warning
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985), stands for the proposition that a pre-deadly force warningshould be given “where feasible”. Garner involved a fleeing, non-dangerous suspect involved in a nonviolent crime. Id. at 4-5. It did not involve an armed man facing an officer and raising a weapon. Therefore, a reasonable officer would not be in fear for his life. (No warning was given to  Mubarak before he was shot.) 

If there is “probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly  force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warninghas been given.” Garner, id. at 11-12. (Mubarak did not commit such a crime.)  

When officers have no reason to believe that deadly force is required to prevent an  escape, particularly when the suspect is completely surrounded, and when the  officers have ample time, the officers need to provide a warningthat they might use deadly force. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016).  

Qualified immunity is typically granted to “officers who used deadly force against armed suspects without giving a warning, when a reasonable officer would have  believed the threat of harm was imminent.” Powell v. Snook, No. 19-13340, 11th Cir. 2019). 

Qualified Immunity
In Graves v. Malone, 810 Fed. Appx 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2020), the officers “had no reason to believe that he held a gun.” He was stationary and non-responsive. He was incapacitated by position. He raised his hand with a black plastic object in it. Nevertheless, the officer decided to shoot him.  

(The responding officers in the present case had no reason to believe that Mubarak had a gun in his possession. Mubarak was “secured” by reason of being in a stationary motor vehicle, which was unable to move, with the doors closed and the windows up. He was noted to be unresponsive, motionless, staring straight ahead.)  

The “mere presence of a gun or other weapon is not enough to warrant the exercise of deadly force and shield an officer from suit.” Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F. 3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016). The use of deadly force was permitted against a mentally unstable man who had a hatchetin his hand and was advancing on an officer. Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F  3d 1093, 1096-7 (11th Cir. 2018). 

...[A]rmed suspects can be secured before an officer disarms them.” Estate of Wayne Jones v. City of Martinsburg, No. 18 -2142, 4th Cir. 2018, citing Young v.Prince George’s County, 355 F.3d 751, 757-58 (4th Cir. 2004). Jones was armed with a knifein a “relatively inaccessible location”, and was unable to wield it given his position. It would therefore be “particularly reasonable to find that Jones  was secured while still armed.” Moreover, it is “excessive force to shoot the  suspect “once he was already immobilized”. “Simply being armed is insufficient to  justify deadly force.”  

 In Untalan v. City of Lorain, United States Court of Appeals, 6th Cir., No. 04 –  4489 (2005), the decedent was armed with a butcher knife, burst out of a room and lunged toward an officer. He was then shot. This individual was neither isolated nor contained at the time of the shooting, unlike Mubarak. See also Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 950 3F. 2D 1036 (6th Cir.1992), wherein the decedent, a  schizophrenic, pointed butcher knivesin each hand toward a police officer, forcing officers to open fire. 

In Tenorio v. Pitzer, United States Court of Appeals, 10th Cir. (2015), the plaintiff was holding a knifeto his own throat. The plaintiff walked toward an officer and  refused the command to put the knife down. He was then shot. “[A] reasonable  jury could find that [he] did not ‘refuse’ to drop the knife because he was not given sufficient time to comply”. Tenorio made no hostile motions toward the officers, but was merely holding a small kitchen knife loosely by his thigh, and made no threatening gestures toward anyone. Id. at 1164. 

The similarities with the present case are striking. In the present case, there is no doubt that Mubarak was not provided sufficient time to comply with any command  or order. In addition, he had made no hostile motions, but was merely holding a small kitchen knife. 

“…[W]here and officer had reason to believe that a suspect was only holding a knife, not a gun, and the suspect was not charging the officer and had made no slicing or stabbing motions toward him,… it [is] unreasonable for the officer to use deadly force against the suspect.” Tenorio, id., citing Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, 997 F. 2d 730, 735-7 (10th Cir. 1993) (another case involving a suspect  holding a knife.) 

In Cole v. Hunter, 68 F. Supp. 3d 628, 644, USDC, No. Dist. TX (2014), the court found that “a reasonable jury could find that Cole never pointed a weapon at the  officers and was not given an opportunity to disarm himself before he was shot.” The court stated that it is “clear to a reasonable officer that shooting a mentally disturbed teenager, who was pointing a gun the entire time at his own head and  facing away from the officers, in an open outdoor area, and who was unaware of the officer’s presence because no warningwas given prior to the officer opening  fire, was unlawful.” Id. at 643. 

“The availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect” Smith v. City of Hemet, 390 4F. 3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), and “whether the individual is mentally ill or emotionally disturbed”, Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.  

3d 1272, 1282 -84 (9th Cir.2001), are factors to be considered in determining whether the use of force was reasonable. 

In Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2020), the court held that  “when officers observe medical symptoms that cannot reasonably meet the mistaken as resistance, they may not respond with force.” Citing McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2010).  

In Glenn v. Washington County, No. CV 08-950 -MO, United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division (2010), plaintiff had a knifein his  possession, but was not in any physical altercation with anyone. He was not threatening others with a knife. No one was trying to get away from him.” “Lack of compliance, active resistance, and receipt of warnings” all weigh against any Constitutional prohibition of officers use of intermediate, less lethal force.” Responding officers are not permitted to escalate“a static situation into an unnecessary and unavoidable shooting”.  

“A suspect who holds a deadly weapon, stands in close proximity to several identifiable potential victims, and repeatedly fails to comply with officers’  commands to drop the weapon, would be considered an immediate threat under existing law. See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280. (Inapposite to the present case.)  

It is “clearly established” and a “straightforward proposition of law” that it is “objectively unreasonable to tasea non-resisting suspect.” Graves, supra at 424,  quoting Eldridge v. city of Warren, 533 Fed. Appx. 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2013). “A simple dichotomy thus emerges: when a suspect actively resists arrest, the police can use a Taser… to subdue him; but when a suspect does not resist, or has stopped resisting, they cannot”. Id., quoting Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468  Fed. Appx. 491, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2012). 

In Amador v. Vasquez, 960 1F. 3d 721 (5th Cir. 2020), the deceased had a knife, not a gun, and was several feet away from officers. He stood stationary in the officer’s line of sight. The case law makes clear that “when an arrestee is not actively resisting arrest, the degree of force and officer can employ is reduced.” Citing Darden, 880 F.3d at 727. It is “objectively unreasonable for officers to tasean arrestee when the arrestee’s ‘behavior did not rise to the level of active  resistance’, despite the arrestee’s alleged noncompliance with orders.’”  

In the present case, Mubarak may be seen as noncompliant with the initial order to get out of the car, but there was, in fact, no way for him to remove himself from the vehicle at the time, and he was not permitted the time to do so. 

Supervisory Liability
Supervisory liability requires some active unconstitutional behavior on the part of the supervisor. Bass V. Robinson, 167 F. 3d 1040, 1048 (sixth circuit 1999). The failure to supervise is only actionable if “the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Id. at 242, citing Shehee, 199 F. 3d at 300. “…[T]he plaintiff must show that the defendant (supervisor) ‘at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.’” Id. quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300.  

(Sgt. Zwillich, WHPD, was the ranking officer at the scene.)  

Failure to Protect
“Liability for failure to protect, meanwhile, arises when ‘(1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used; and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.’” Graves at 420, quoting Goodwin v. City of Plainsville, 781 F.3d 314,  328 (6th Cir. 2015), citing Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997).  

Trooper Dalling and WHPD Sgt. Zwillich did absolutely nothing to intercede/de escalate. 

WHPD Officer Rappa, who broke the window, was complicit and enabled Trooper Jackson to deploy the taser. Deploying the taser was inappropriate and unjustified.  Neither of them did anything to ensure that Mubarak was not killed.